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THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: THE
MUDDIED WATERS OF ROCKWEED
MANAGEMENT IN MAINE
Sarah M. Reiter1, Dillon Post2, Lisa Wedding3, Aaron L. Strong4
Abstract
Seaweeds, or more properly, intertidal macroalgae have never been easy
to classify—by law or by science: they are not part of the animal kingdom,
nor part of the plant kingdom (and scientific controversies about their
phylogenetic placement abound), they are not completely on terra firma,
nor completely submerged in ocean water. One such organism that exists
at the space in between land and sea—the brown alga commonly known
as Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum) presents an intriguing legal
question with implications that extend far beyond the shoreline. Recently,
in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
(Court) ruled that Rockweed located within the intertidal zone is the
property of the adjacent upland property owner, and therefore the public
cannot enter intertidal lands to harvest Rockweed as a matter of right—a
right that has been preserved for the harvest of shellfish species, fish
species, and bird species. The legal status of Rockweed is important to the
scientists that study its ecological benefits, the harvesters that collect it for
commercial purposes, the state agency concerned with its sustainable
management as a marine resource, and the coastal landowners that assert
that seaweed is their private property. This article explores the legal
justification for—and practical resource management issues associated
with—the Court’s decision to treat a marine organism such as Rockweed
that derives its nutrients from ocean water and not through a root system
as private property.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Along the rocky shores of Maine, in that dynamic place
where land meets sea and the tides ebb and flow, no one knew who
owned the seaweed until recently. The legal status of Rockweed—
the harvest of which is a growing industry in Maine—is important
to the scientists that study its ecological benefits, the harvesters that
collect it for commercial purposes, the state agency concerned with
its sustainable management as a marine resource, and the coastal
landowners that assert it as their private property. Algae have never
been easy to classify—by law or by science—they are not quite part
of the animal kingdom, nor the plant kingdom, not completely on
terra firma, nor completely submerged under water. However, in
Spring 2019, in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., 206 A. 3d 283, 283296 (2019), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (Court) ruled that
Rockweed located within the intertidal zone is the property of the
adjacent upland owner, and therefore the public cannot harvest
Rockweed as a matter of right—a right that has been preserved for
the harvest of shellfish species, fish species, and bird species. 5 This
ruling strays from that norm, where states predominantly consider
access to marine organisms as part of the public trust.6 For example,
clams, mussels, fish, and the activities associated with their harvest
(e.g., fishing, digging) are held in trust by the state of Maine for the
people.7
With seaweed now private property, harvesters and scientists
will look to coastal landowners to grant permission to access
Rockweed, not the state. Landowners will decide if and how the
5

Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 33, 206 A. 3d 283, 294.
See John Duff & Cheryl Daigle, Public Shoreline Access in Maine: A Citizen’s
Guide to Ocean and Coastal Law, 4 (2004) (discussing Maine’s public trust
doctrine and how it protects the rights to harvest fish, shellfish, and other marine
organisms); see also The Wildlife Society et al., The Public Trust Doctrine:
Implicating for Wildlife Management and Conservation in the United States and
Canada, TECH. REV. 10-01, 22 (2010) (discussing the application of the Public
Trust Doctrine to wildlife, and providing North Carolina’s Public Trust
protection of marine organisms as an example).
7
State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 888 (Me. 1952); State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875, 879
(Me. 1909); see also Duff & Daigle, supra note 1.
6
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Rockweed can be accessed based on their own individual interests
(e.g., aesthetic, financial, and ecological). The management of
Rockweed as a resource has shifted from a resource management
policy, established at the state level and informed by scientific
information, to a system of rights and access or denial based on
individual property owner incentives. This marine organism that
exists at the space in between land and sea presents an intriguing
legal question with implications that go far beyond the shoreline. In
Part II of this article, we provide a background on the Public Trust
Doctrine. In Part III, we provide a background on Rockweed and its
role in Maine’s coastal social-ecological ecosystem. In Parts IV and
V, we consider the legal treatment of Rockweed under Maine law.
In Part VI, we explore the practical implications of the Court’s
decision for Rockweed’s future in Maine. Finally, in Part VII, we
address the broader implications of the privatization of Rockweed.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND DETERMINATIONS
REGARDING COMMON POOL RESOURCES AND PRIVATE GOODS IN THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The Public Trust Doctrine – a state level common law
doctrine – holds that state-owned lands are held in public trust to the
benefit of all citizens subject to certain usage rights. Under the
doctrine, states have a trust responsibility to manage such lands for
the public benefit. In particular, the Public Trust Doctrine
undergirds states’ responsibility to manage publicly accessible
common pool resources for the public good. 8 A strong Public Trust
Doctrine in a state indicates a greater degree of legal recognition of
a state’s responsibility to pursue sustainable resource use and
provides a legal prong available for members of the public with an
interest in sustainability to argue in lawsuits. For example, the
expanded state Public Trust Doctrine was used in New Jersey to
justify citizen suits blocking construction of a coastal high rise that
would block an aesthetic viewshed, arguing that the state must

8

Raphael D. Sagarin & Mary Turnipseed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Where
Ecology Meets Natural Resources Management, 37 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENV’T
& RES. 473, 481 (2012).
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manage coastal areas for the benefit of the public.9 Notably, the
expanded Public Trust Doctrine has been featured prominently in
recent legal scholarship focused on state responsibility to address
climate change.10 As increasingly complex questions of state
responsibility to mitigate to and adapt to climate change in coastal
areas arise, whether state Public Trust Doctrines continue to expand
is a salient and critical legal question.
Submerged and intertidal lands are a significant focus of the
Public Trust Doctrine in coastal states in the United States. In much
of the coastal United States, the intertidal zone between the low
water line and the high tide line is also state property, held in trust
by the state and regulated and managed for use by the public under
the authority of that state’s Public Trust Doctrine. In the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and in the State of Maine (which
was part of Massachusetts prior to 1820), however, the intertidal
zone remains the private property of the upland property owner,
with statutory bundles of rights reserved for the public to access
these private lands for the purposes of fishing, fowling, and
navigation.11 Thus, on its face, the case of Ross v. Acadian Seaplants
Ltd. presented a question of whether access to the intertidal for the
harvest of Rockweed is protected for the public under the state’s
Public Trust Doctrine.
At issue in the case of Rockweed management, however, is
not simply who is assigned the right of access to a space. It is about
how a state regulates the right to use of a resource in that space. In
the natural resource management texts and economics more broadly,
resources are frequently categorized into four bins: public goods
9

Hope Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland
from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7
(2015).
10
See e.g., Tim Eichenberg, Sean Bothwell & Darcy Vaughn, Climate Change
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Using an Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising
Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay, 3 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 245
(2009); Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights:
The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 59, 66, 75, 89 (2011).
11
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (citing Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance of 1641); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me.
1989) [hereinafter Bell II] (discussing how the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance of 1641 applies to Maine, and the ordinance’s grant of rights for
fishing, fowling, and navigation).
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(low excludability, low rivalry of consumption), club goods (high
excludability, low rivalry of consumption), common pool resources
(low excludability, high rivalry of consumption) and private goods
(high excludability, high rivalry of consumption). By deciding the
case in one direction or another, the Court was in effect determining
if a resource was a common pool resource or a private good. The
Court’s decision not only decided the question in favor of securing
the right to use Rockweed to the upland property owner, but also by
determining that Rockweed is a private good in effect curtailed the
state of Maine’s interest in determining the best course of
management of a natural resource. At a time when many natural
resource management agencies around the world and around the
United States are implementing management pathways that include
privatizing access to fisheries in an effort to ensure fishery
sustainability,12 the Court’s decision presents a notable case of
sudden privatization of all Rockweed fishery access in a state. How
this decision affects the future of the fishery in Maine will present a
dramatic case study of rapid privatization.
Also at issue in this case is a larger question of how complex
scientific questions about sustainability and ecological impact
should be adjudicated. Courts regularly draw on the longestablished common law usage of legal analogy to answer complex
scientific questions. Yet, in this case, there were detailed scientific
studies that could have been drawn upon to address the analogybased question of “is Rockweed more like a fish (and therefore the
right to the resource should be held for the public), or more like a
crop growing in soil (and therefore the private property of the
landowner)?” However, the Court made determinations as a matter
of law, and in doing so, failed to address the issue of Rockweed
management and ownership as a matter of science.
III. ROCKWEED AND ITS ROLE IN MAINE’S COASTAL SOCIALECOLOGICAL ECOSYSTEM
In North America, seaweeds have been used by indigenous
peoples for millennia and by settler colonists for centuries. The
12

Courtney Carothers & Catherine Chambers, Fisheries Privatization and the
Remaking of Fishery Systems, 3 ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 39, 44 (2012).
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intertidal brown alga Ascophyllum nodosum—commonly called
Knotted Wrack, or simply Rockweed—grows along northeastern
coastlines of the United States and in maritime Canada, as well as
the coastlines of northwestern Europe and Ireland. While
Ascophyllum nodosum is not consumed directly as food by humans,
its value as a fertilizer has long been recognized. Dead and dried
Ascophyllum nodosum that is collected above the high water line has
long been used as “sea manure” due to its high concentrations of
macro- and micro-nutrients. More recently, a commercial harvest of
living Ascophyllum nodosum has emerged. Uses of commercially
harvested Rockweed include as fertilizer, but also, after processing,
as a dietary supplement for livestock.13 The shipping industry uses
Rockweed as a packing material to keep seafood moist for shipping,
most notably, Maine’s $600 million lobster industry.
Because of its multiple commercial uses and due to the ease
of locating it along the coastline, the commercial Rockweed fishery
has rapidly increased. An established industry in Western Europe
and maritime Canada, the first commercial harvest of Rockweed in
Maine began in the 1970s.14 In 2003, Rockweed harvest in Maine
eclipsed 3.27 million pounds.15 Ten years later, in 2012, Rockweed
landings had quadrupled, surpassing 14.6 million pounds.16
Economically, Rockweed harvest brings around $20 million into the
Maine coastal economy annually.17
Importantly for disputes about access to Rockweed as a
resource, these meteoric increases in landings were driven largely
by the entry into the fishery of a Canadian company – Acadian
Seaplants, whose harvesters have taken more than 90% of the
Rockweed harvest annually, primarily in areas on the Cobscook Bay
region of far eastern Maine.18

13

Harinder Makkar et al., Seaweeds for Livestock Diets: a Review, 212 ANIMAL
FEED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 12 (2016).
14
Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Maine Sea Grant and Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, Rockweed Ecology,
Industry and Management Fact Sheet (2013).
18
Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014).
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Also due to the rapid increase in landings, the Maine
Department of Natural Resources decided to develop a Fishery
Management Plan (Management Plan) to develop rules and
guidelines for managing the fishery.19 The Management Plan was
developed by a Plan Development Team including University of
Maine scientists, state agency staff, conservation organization
representatives, and Rockweed industry members. Part of the
impetus for the development of the Management Plan came from
the rise in landings, but part also came from high profile concerns in
the academic literature about the ecological implications of
unregulated harvest of Rockweed for the Maine coastline. In 2012,
two scientists writing an article in Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences concluded, inter alia, “Rockweed has critical value as
habitat, as food, and as a nutrient source supporting a community of
over 150 other organisms…Cutting Rockweed has documented
impacts on the alga itself and on the Rockweed community as a
whole.”20 These authors reasoned that the Rockweed harvest merits
a precautionary approach and that no commercial harvest should be
permitted until further studies of the ecological impact of harvest
had been completed, stating: “A metric for an ecologically
sustainable harvest must be based on the data from large-scale, longterm studies of postharvest recovery of Rockweed morphology, of
Rockweed community structure and function, and of ecosystem
impacts. Until this metric is developed and enforceable regulations
based on it are developed, commercial-scale Rockweed cutting
should not be permitted.”21 Likening Rockweed beds to “old growth
forests,” one of the authors of that 2012 paper, Robin Hadlock
Seeley has also led active activist groups focused on the
conservation of habitat forming seaweeds. 22 Notably, prominent
algal phycologists have publicly disputed Seeley’s conclusions
about the sustainability of Rockweed harvest, arguing that cutting

19

Id.
Robin H. Seeley & William H. Schlesinger, Sustainable seaweed cutting? The
Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum) industry of Maine and the Maritime
Provinces, ANNALS OF THE N.Y.C. ACAD. OF SCI., Feb. 2012, at 98.
21
Id.
22
Clare Leschin-Hoar, Help for Kelp – Seaweed Slashers See Harvesting Cuts
Coming, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May 14, 2014.
20
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Rockweed in Maine is sustainable,23 and presenting concerns about
Rockweed incorrectly being labeled a plant. 24 Some studies have
suggested that cutting Rockweed fronds while leaving sixteen
inches has only short term effects on local community ecology and
that there is an increase in medium-sized fronds after cutting
creating bushier rockweeds post-harvest. 25
Scientifically, Ascophyllum nodosum is not a plant, but a
brown alga in the Kingdom Chromista. While it is photosynthetic
using sunlight, carbon dioxide and water to create biomass and
grow, it does not create a rooting structure and derives all of its
nutrients from marine sources rather than from soils. Rockweed
fixes itself in the intertidal zone through the use of a holdfast, which
it uses to attach to rocks or other substrates. It maintains buoyancy
and thus access to sunlight for growth through the use of small air
bladders. Rockweed reproduces in spring and early summer once
water temperatures are warm enough. Rockweed produces
receptacles that subsequently release eggs and sperm into the water
for external fertilization. While it is scientifically challenging to
identify a single Rockweed “individual”26 a single Rockweed frond
growing out of a holdfast can remain in place for decades.27
IV. TREATMENT OF ROCKWEED UNDER MAINE LAW

23

Susan Brawley, Look at the Science – Maine harvesting of Rockweed is
sustainable, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (Jun. 3, 2014),
https://bangordailynews.com/2014/06/03/opinion/contributors/look-at-thescience-maine-harvesting-of-rockweed-is-sustainable/.
24
Jessica Muhlin & Susan Brawley. Science should be heeded – Rockweed is
not a plant, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2019),
https://bangordailynews.com/2019/04/28/opinion/contributors/science-shouldbe-heeded-rockweed-is-not-a-plant/.
25
Jill C. Fegley, Ecological implications of Rockweed Ascophyllum Nodosum L.
le jolis, harvesting" (2001) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maine).
26
Per Åberg, Distinguishing Between Genetic Individuals in Ascophyllum
nodosum Populations on the Swedish west Coast." 24 BRITISH PHYCOLOGICAL
JOURNAL, June 1989 at: 183.
27
Steve Dudgeon, & Peter S. Petraitis, First year demography of the foundation
species, Ascophyllum nodosum, and its community implications, 109 OIKOS, no.
2, 2005 at 405.
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The property rights of riparian owners in the state of Maine
vary based upon the high and low tide marks. 28 The state of Maine
holds the rights of the coastal waters and the submerged land below
the low tide mark in public trust.29 The upland landowner owns the
coastal waters and submerged land between the high tide mark and
the low tide mark, known as the intertidal zone.30 However, there
are reserved public rights to “fish, fowl and navigate.” 31 The land
above the high tide mark is private, but landowners are allowed to
grant rights to the public.32 In Maine, private landowners own an
overwhelming majority of the 3,500 mile coastline.33
Unlike other marine resources such as shellfish, Rockweed’s
life cycle functions similarly to plants (Rockweeds are sessile and
photosynthetic) and to fish (they derive nutrition from the ocean and
are exclusively marine).34 Rockweed attaches to rocky substrates
along the seabed, but does not harvest any nutrients from the soil.35
This unusual intersection posed many challenges for the legal
system of rights. Specifically, the Court in Ross v. Acadian
Seaplants Ltd. had to articulate whether the public trust doctrine that
covers shellfish covered this macroalga as well. In this case, the
Court investigated the right to harvest Rockweed under two
different legal doctrines.36 First, the Court explored whether there
28

John Duff et al., PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS IN MAINE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 2 (Catherine Schmidt, 3rd ed. 2006); Public Trust
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1014) (defining the public trust
doctrine as the principle that navigable waters are preserved for the public use,
and that the state is responsible for protecting the public's right to the use).
29
John Duff et al., Supra note 23 at 2.
30
Bell, 557 A. 2d at 172 (1989); John Duff et al., supra note 23 at 2. Maine’s
approach to rights in the intertidal zone is somewhat unique; in several states,
the intertidal zone is held in trust by the state see The Wildlife Soc’y, supra note
1 (discussing the application of the public trust doctrine to the marine
environment in different states).
31
John Duff et al., supra note 23 at 2.
32
Id.
33
Id. This is in contrast to other states, such as Oregon, where the state owns
from the water up to the line of vegetation. Erin Pitts, The Public Trust
Doctrine, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 736 (1992).
34
Allison L. Schmidt et al., Ecosystem structure and services in eelgrass Zostera
marina and Rockweed Ascophyllum nodosum habitats, 437 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 51, 52 (2011).
35
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, *2
(Me. Super. 2017); Schmidt et al., supra note 29 at 52. ROCKWEED
36
Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *1-4.

2020]

The Future of Public Trust

245

are public rights to Rockweed within the intertidal zone, under the
doctrine of profit a pendre 37 Second, the Court addressed whether
or not the harvest of Rockweed was a protected public right under
the public trust doctrine.38 This section will explore the history of
the two doctrines, and their legal application to Rockweed.
A.

Profit a Pendre

The right to profit from the taking of a part of the soil or
product of the land of another is known as a profit a prendre.39
However, Maine law considers aquatic access rights held by those
who do not own the soil to be easements. 40 In the 1861 case of Hill
v. Lord,41 the Court addressed the issue of whether or not the public
had a right to harvest dried seaweed as “sea manure” from the
intertidal zone.42 The Court focused on whether or not the right to
harvest seaweed from a privately held intertidal zone was an
easement or a profit a prendre.43 The importance in the distinction
was that the inhabitants of the town would be able to claim an
easement by custom only if the harvest of seaweed was considered
an easement, and not a profit a prendre, because a right to the land
cannot be acquired by custom if the landowner holds a profit a
prendre.44
In Hill v. Lord, the Court identified that the owner of the
intertidal zone holds title to the seaweed on the flats, so long as the
owner has not severed that right.45 The Court determined that the
right to harvest seaweed was a profit a prendre and not an

37

A profit a prendre right grants the landowners the rights to profit from the
bounty of their lands. Further discussion of profits a prendre is provided in the
next section. Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2.
38
Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2-4.
39
28A C.J.S. Easements § 14 (2017) (explaining that a “profit a prendre “right”
gives the profit holder the right to sever and remove from the land of another a
physical substance.” For example the right to hunt and fish on another’s land is a
profit a prendre.).
40
Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 96 (1861)
41
Id. at 83-101.
42
Id. at 96.
43
Id. at 98.
44
Id. at 97-99.
45
Id. at 96.
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easement.46 To reach this conclusion, the Court compared the
harvest of seaweed to the (1) cutting of grass and hay; (2) grazing of
livestock; (3) hunting; and (4) fishing from an un-navigable
stream.47 Acknowledging that aquatic rights are generally
easements, the Court still determined that the harvest of dried
seaweed washed upon the seashore was a right to take profit in the
soil.48 Therefore, the inhabitants of Kennebunkport were barred
from harvesting such seaweed on the private property, because the
landowner had not deeded away the right to harvest.49
In the present case that serves as the focal point of this
article, the lower court used both profit a prendre and the public
trust doctrine analysis to determine who holds the right to harvest
Rockweed.50 Under the profit a prendre analysis, the lower court
relied on the Hill v. Lord holding, finding that the right to harvest is
a profit a prendre.51 The trial court determined that the landowner
holds the profit right of Rockweed in fee simple, and has complete
control over the right to harvest Rockweed. 52 And in this case, the
landowner had not deeded that right to the public or Acadian
Seaplants.53 In making this decision, the court had to circumvent the
Acadian Seaplants’ argument that Hill v. Lord applies only to
seaweed once washed upon the shore, citing Anthony v. Gifford.54
In Gifford, the Massachusetts court55 held that once seaweed and
other marine plants detach from the intertidal floor and wash onto
the seashore, the rights vest in the landowner. 56 In short, until the
seaweed washes onto the seashore, the upland owner has no rights

46

Id. at 101.
Id. at 99-100.
48
Id. at 83, 98-101.
49
Id. at 100-101.
50
Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3.
53
Id. at 3-4.
54
Id. at 4.
55
Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810); Bell, 557 A. 2d at 172 (the “rule of
law governing titles to intertidal land had its origin in the Colonial Ordinance of
1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and long before the separation of
Maine was received into the common law of Massachusetts by long usage and
practice throughout the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.”).
56
Anthony v. Gifford, 84 Mass. 549, 549 (1861).
47
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to the seaweed.57 The defendant argued that private rights of
Rockweed attach, only after Rockweed detaches from the rockbed.58
The court, however, found that Gifford does not apply, because
Gifford failed to speak directly to the harvest of seaweed that is still
attached to the intertidal rock floor, and not floating with the tide.59
To conclude, the lower court held that the landowner owns the rights
to the Rockweed in the intertidal zone, because the landowner had
not deeded this right to the public or to the defendant. 60 This
conclusion destroyed the claim that Rockweed harvesters gleaned
rights to the Rockweed by custom—an argument afforded only if
the landowner does not hold a profit a prendre right.61
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine

States have the authority to assert regulatory power over the
coastal zone via either the police power, or the public trust
doctrine.62 Under the police power, the state has legislative power
to protect public health, safety, and welfare. 63 However, the police
power is subject to limitations on its power to create coherent coastal
management programs.64 The police power is specialized enough to
deal with conflicting legitimate coastal uses. 65 Further, states
traditionally use the police power to restrict harmful activities, and
the use of the police power is infantile in creating affirmative
proactive management plans.66 Finally, the police power can result

57

Id.
See Ross, No. SC-CV-15-022, 2017 WL1247566, at *2-4 (arguing that the
landowner’s rights to seaweed does not attach until it washes ashore).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See Hill, 48 Me.at 99 (explaining that the public cannot glean rights via
custom if landowners hold a profit a prendre).
62
JACK A. CAREY ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF AMERICA’S COASTS, 3 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. X.
63
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 422, 456 (1827); JACK A. CAREY ET AL.,
supra note 57, at 3.
64
JACK A. CAREY ET AL., supra note 62, at 3.
65
Id.
66
Id.
58

248

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:2

in a regulatory taking if the result of the regulation goes “too far.”67
Therefore, states often rely on the use of the public trust doctrine in
conjunction with the police power. 68
The Public Trust Doctrine is an ancient property law
principle, originating from the English common law.69 The public
trust doctrine, as a principle, exists in every state. 70 The general rule
is that (a) all tidelands and navigable waters owned by the thirteen
colonies transferred title to the existing states via succession; (b) the
states own the tidelands and navigable waters subject to a “public
trust” to benefit all citizens with certain usage rights related to
maritime commerce, navigation and fishing; and (c) all land granted
from the state to private landowners is subject to the public trust. 71
In the United States, the use of coastal lands and the natural
resources located over such lands and waters out to 3 nautical miles
is a matter of state law—with few exceptions. 72 The scope of the
67

Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Penn Central
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(holding that a permanent physical invasion of private property is a taking per
se); JACK A. CAREY ET AL., supra note 62, at 3..
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Pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), states hold title to the submerged
lands and the natural resources in such lands and waters out to 3 nautical miles. .
. subject to certain reservations.”); see Phillips Petroleum Co. v.. Mississippi,
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(stating “it is…beyond a doubt that the determination of public and private
rights in the intertidal land is fundamentally a matter of state law,” and
providing an extensive list of support).
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state power to regulate public trust lands “is directly related to the
public interests that the doctrine is intended to protect.” 73 In Shivley
v. Bowlbly, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the public
trust doctrine is to guarantee that tidelands are put to the best uses
for the public interest.74
In Maine, the public trust doctrine is rooted in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinances of 1641 and 1647.75 To
encourage private landowners to invest in structures that ventured
below the high water mark, the General Court of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony enacted the 1647 ordinance granting, “upland owners
property rights down to the low water mark,” and the public the
rights to the intertidal zone for “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”76
Massachusetts incorporated the concepts of the Ordinance into
common law.77 Later, when Maine achieved statehood, “the
principles of the Ordinance were said to be adopted into Maine’s
common law under Article X of the Maine Constitution.”78
However, Maine did not explicitly adopt the language of the
Ordinance.79 The Maine judiciary sustained the custom of private
ownership of the intertidal zone that originated with the
Ordinance.80
The Maine Judiciary has always accepted that the public “at
large” has the rights to “fish, fowl and navigate” within the intertidal
zone.81 However, the interpretation of the scope of the right
73

JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 57, at 10.
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(Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1975).
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enumerated in the ordinance has varied over time. Under one
approach, the public rights to “fish,” “fowl,” and “navigate” can
only extend to a “natural derivative” of one of the enumerative
rights.82 The other approach finds that the court is not bound to the
literal uses enumerated in the ordinance. 83
Strict interpretation of the Ordinance derives from the Bell
cases. In Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) (Bell I),
the issue in the lower court was whether the public had a right to
access to Moody Beach for recreational purposes. 84 In Bell I, the
Maine Supreme Court addressed (1) whether the lower court
properly dismissed the case because the state was the trustee of
public rights in the beach, and (2) whether the state interest made
the state and indispensable party, and therefore barred the plaintiff’s
quiet title actions under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 85 The
court vacated the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs (owners of
property adjacent to the coast) hold fee in title to the intertidal land
under the Ordinance. Therefore, in Bell I the Court did not address
whether the public trust doctrine grants the public an easement to
access the intertidal zone for recreation, and therefore did not reach
analysis regarding the scope of the public trust doctrine. 86
Three years later in Bell II, Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d.
168 (Me. 1989), the Court did assess the scope of the public trust
doctrine relating to recreation.87 The Majority started by stating that
oceanfront owners hold a fee simple interest in the intertidal zone
subject only to the easements stated in the Ordinance. Next, the
Majority stated the public easement in the intertidal zone does not
extend beyond that “reserved” in the colonial ordinance “broadly

Court is forced to help decipher the nature and scope of the three rights under
the Maine Public Trust Doctrine).
82
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (1974).
83
Donahue, supra note 73, at 597. Cases that demonstrate this interpretation
include: French V. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434 (1841) (finding that the public has
the right to use the intertidal zone as a public highway when covered in ice);
Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 48 (1907) (holding that the public
has a right to land and offload a vessel within the intertidal zone).
84
Bell I, 510 A 2d. at 510 (Me. 1986).
85
Id at 515-518.
86
Id. at 518; See also Bell II, 557 A. 2d at 171, n. 8 (providing a concise
summary of the holding in Bell I).
87
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.
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construed.” Citing Barrows v. McDermott88, the Majority observed
that the public holds the rights to “fish,” “fowl,” and “navigate” for
pleasure, as well as for business or sustenance. 89 Next, the Majority
stated that the Court has generally given a “sympathetically
generous interpretation of what is encompassed within the three
terms “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation,” or reasonably
incidental or related thereto.”90 Next, the Court held that the
plaintiff’s claim that the public has a general recreation easement to
use Moody Beach, “cannot be justified as encompassed in, or
reasonably related to ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling’ or ‘navigation.”91
Reaching this conclusion, the Majority stated that to expand the
ordinance to recreation would equate to the Court legislating from
the bench, because there is no basis in finding a general recreation
easement embodied in the ordinance.92 As well, the Majority
explained that adding an easement for recreation would make the
aggregate easement more burdensome on the landowners. 93 In short,
the Majority in Bell II acknowledged that the interpretation of the
ordinance is reserved to a broad construction of the terms
enumerated, and held that the Ordinance does not grant the public
an easement for general recreation.94 This remarks a stark change in
the court’s approach to the public trust doctrine. Before Bell II, the
Court’s recognized that public rights to the intertidal zone were not
static, and that the rights could evolve over time.95 Bell II marks a
dramatic change from the dynamic approach to interpreting the
Ordinance, and instead applied a strict textual interpretation. 96
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The three justice Dissent in Bell II disagreed.97 Led by
Justice Wathen, the dissent stated that public recreational rights are
“not confined strictly to ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’
however ‘sympathetically generous’ the interpretation of those
terms might be.”98 The dissent emphasized that the Ordinance was
not the “exclusive and preeminent” source of all public rights in
Maine.99 Instead, the dissent highlighted that public rights to the
intertidal zone existed at common law before the Ordinance, and
that the Ordinance did not “displace” those rights. 100 Moreover, the
policy forwarded by the Majority leads to exclusion—a result at
odds with the function and history of the public trust doctrine in the
intertidal zone.101 Next, the Dissent focused on the large body of
precedent that strayed away from reasonable interpretation of the
terms “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation.”102 Finally, the Dissent
concluded that the case “does not require that we delineate the outer
limits of public rights,” but did argue that the public’s rights are “at
a minimum broad enough to include such recreational activities as
bathing, sunbathing, and walking.” 103 Moreover, the Dissent struck
at the Majority’s policy argument, and stated that recreation does
not place an additional burden on shoreowners.104 Finally, the
Dissent argued that “any further refinement [of the public’s rights
under the Ordinance] should await common law development or
legislative action.” 105 All in all, the Bell II dissent found the public’s
rights under the ordinance and common law were broad enough to
include recreation. 106 And, unlike the Majority, the Dissent
maintained the dynamic approach to interpreting the Ordinance—
permitting uses besides those included in the Ordinance. 107 The
dichotomy between the Majority and dissent illustrates the sharp
dissimilarity between the two approaches to analyzing public rights
97
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to the intertidal zone. However, both the Majority and Dissent noted
that further refinement of the public rights in the intertidal zone
should be addressed by the legislature.108
In 2011, McGarvey v. Whittredge strayed from the strict
analysis in Bell II, and highlights the more liberal approach to
interpretation of the Ordinance.109 The Court indicated that prior to
Bell II, a more expansive and holistic approach to interpreting the
colonial ordinance’s access rights was the standard. 110 Using the
dissent in Bell II, the Court articulated a two-part test.111 First, the
Court determines if the intended activity in the intertidal falls
“readily” within “fishing,” “fowling,” or “navigation.” 112 If the
answer is yes, the activity is a public right. 113 If not, the second
question is applied: should the court read the common law to
incorporate the activity as protected under the public trust
doctrine?114 The McGarvey Court then applied the test to determine
whether or not the public right extends to allow the public to walk
across the intertidal lands to SCUBA dive.115 The Court held the
access to the private lands of the intertidal zone for SCUBA diving
was a public right.116
The McGarvey decision left the three enumerated terms in
the ordinance open to further interpretation beyond the text of
“fishing,” “fowling,” or “navigation.”117 In effect, the decision
cracked the door for modern expansion of the traditional
easements—extending public access to the intertidal zone to
SCUBA divers.118 Of the three enumerated rights, the harvest of
Rockweed is most similar to fishing. As such, the majority of the
next section will discuss precedent under the fishing easement, and
how the Court in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd. applied the
McGarvey test. The harvest of Rockweed, however, may also
108
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require “navigation.” Under “navigation,” the activity must involve
some mode of transportation.119 The Court has found that the act of
mooring vessels and loading cargo has been protected under the
public trust doctrine.120 The underlying rationale behind the
“navigation” element of the Maine public trust doctrine is that “state
owned waters are of a common right, a public highway, for the use
of all the citizens.”121 The Court has also found that travel on
intertidal land to get to and from land or houses also fell under
“navigation.”122 All-in-all, the Maine Public Trust Doctrine serves
to maintain public access and use of the intertidal zone for “fishing,
fowling, and navigation” based activities. Maine and Massachusetts
courts have often been required to identify the extent of the public
right to “fish” within the intertidal zone.123 In Town of Wellfleet v.
Glaze, the Court addressed whether the state had the authority to
grant permits to plant, grow, and harvest shellfish within the
intertidal zone.124 The court first acknowledged that the public right
to fish included the right to dig for shellfish. 125 Generally, the right
to fish expands to both moving fish in the water, and those
embedded in the mud, including the digging of worms.126 While
Town of Wellfleet was decided on jurisdictional grounds, 127 a twojustice concurrence explored the merits of the case, including the
distinction between naturally occurring shellfish and farmed
shellfish.128 The O’Connor concurrence found that “Aquaculture is
not fishing, nor can it be considered a natural derivative of the right
to fish.”129 The concurrence further highlighted that the right to fish
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cannot be construed to include rights to plant, cultivate or harvest
fish within the intertidal zone.130
In Ross v. Acadian Seaplants Ltd., the trial court applied the
McGarvey test.131 Under the first prong of McGarvey, the court
found no similarity or reasonable correlation between fishing and
the harvest of Rockweed—despite the court’s acknowledgement
that there is an easement to harvest shellfish and dig for worms. 132
The trial court found that harvesting a terrestrial plant was no more
similar to fishing than cutting down a tree and emphasized that
Rockweed is a terrestrial plant.133 Classifying Rockweed as a
terrestrial plant is taxonomically incorrect—it is a brown alga that is
as closely related to vascular plants as it is to multicellular animals.
It also does not acknowledge Rockweed’s full life cycle—unlike
terrestrial plants, Rockweed derives no nutrients from the land and
reproduces through external fertilization in ocean water134
Furthermore, because waves break Rockweed loose from the
substrate, which then floats in the intertidal zone, defining
Rockweed as a plant presents a challenge. Rockweed “has an
enchanted double life” as both a kind-of plantlike organism and a
kind-of fish or shellfish-like organism. 135 As a result, classifying
Rockweed under the public trust doctrine requires the court to
fabricate a general definition, which does not properly represent
what the published scientific literature understands.
Moving to the second prong of the test, the trial court did not
interpret the common law to protect the harvest of Rockweed. 136 The
court looked to similar public easements protected under the public
trust doctrine to differentiate the harvest of Rockweed. 137 The court
acknowledged the public holds an easement to harvest shellfish or
130
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to dig for clams, but not to harvest the mussel bed or to take ice. 138
The Court then looked to Hill v. Lord, to determine if there is a
public easement related to the harvest of seaweed. 139 The court
found Hill dissimilar because in that case the Court upheld a public
right to harvest of seaweed under the theory profit a prendre and not
an easement. 140 As a result, the court did not find Hill persuasive
in supporting that there was a public easement to harvest Rockweed.
Therefore, the court did not find that the common law “should be
understood” to include the harvest of rockweed, so the court did not
find an easement under the second prong of the McGarvey test.141
Unable to meet either element of the McGarvey test, the court did
not find a public right to harvest Rockweed in the intertidal zone.142
V. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE DECISION
In Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd.,143 the Court reviewed the
lower court decision, and explained the limited issue before the
court as “whether living Rockweed, growing on and attached to
intertidal land is—as Ross asserts—the private property of the
adjoining upland owner who owns the intertidal zone in fee, or—as
Acadian counters—a public resource held in trust by the state.” 144
The Court acknowledged that the case “draws [the court] into the
confluence of public and private property rights within the intertidal
zone,”145 and concluded, “the public may not harvest living
Rockweed growing in and attached to the privately-owned intertidal
zone.” 146
The Court began by accepting that the nature and extent of
the public’s interest in the intertidal zone is subject to “much debate,
litigation, and judicial writing,” and admitting that the precedent
does not clearly establish a delineation between the public and
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private rights in and to the intertidal zone.147 The Court then focused
on the analytical frameworks articulated in the McGarvey majority
and concurrence. 148 Chief Justice Saufley’s approach in McGarvey
explained that the three terms fishing, fowling, and navigation
should be broadly understood.149 While Justice Levy’s concurrence
in McGarvey analyzed the terms based “on the limiting principle
that the enumerated rights of ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’
were ‘never understood …to merely establish a context for some
broader right or rights.’”150
The Court started its analysis with the final term of the
trilogy - “navigation.” The Court acknowledged that there is a
navigational component of harvesting Rockweed because harvesters
operate skiffs in the intertidal waters to harvest the Rockweed. 151
However, the Court found that no matter how broadly the term
“navigation” is construed,152 the harvesting of Rockweed involves
the use of the intertidal land itself, because “living Rockweed is
attached to the intertidal substrate even if it does not draw nutrients
from the land.”153 Acknowledging that Rockweed harvesting does
include the use of boats, the Court highlighted that the use of boats
are a secondary activity to the harvest of Rockweed. 154 Rockweed
harvesters enter the intertidal zone with their primary purpose being
to cut and take rockweed.155 The Court concluded that the term
“navigation” does not encompass harvesting living Rockweed from
the intertidal zone, because Acadian Seaplants’ primary use of the
intertidal waters is not for crossing water or land, but is to gain
access to the attached Rockweed.156
The Court then turned to “fishing.” Despite the shape
shifting nature of this algae, that belongs neither in the animal or
plant kingdom,157 the Court started by stating that Rockweed is a
147
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plant.158 As well, the Court highlighted that Rockweed is
biologically dissimilar from fish, lobster, clams, oysters, and
bloodworms because “[rockweed] draws nutrients from the air and
seawater using a photosynthetic process and, once attached to the
intertidal substrate, [do not] move.”159 The Court then concluded that
even an overly generous interpretation of the public’s rights “cannot
transform the harvesting of a marine plant into ‘fishing.’” 160
Having determined that the harvesting of Rockweed does not
fall within the public right to use the intertidal zone for “fishing” or
“navigation,” the Court analyzed the harvesting of Rockweed under
Justice Levy’s concurrence in McGarvey: whether “the common
law approach permits the public to harvest Rockweed as an activity
that constitutes a ‘reasonable balance’ between the public’s rights
within the intertidal zone and the private property interest held by
the upland property owner.”161 The Court found that the burden of
cutting and removing plants with specialized equipment is not a
reasonable burden the landowner should bear.162 Acadian and other
harvesters use specialized equipment and skiffs with multi-ton
capacity.163 Moreover, “Acadian’s activity is qualitatively similar to
other uses of the intertidal zone that [the Court has] held are outside
of the public trust doctrine.”164 Therefore, the right to harvest
Rockweed does not strike a reasonable balance between public
rights and the burden imposed on private landowners. Unable to find
the harvest of Rockweed as a public right under “fishing” or
“navigation” the Court held that the harvest of Rockweed is not a
public right.
Chief Justice Saufley filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice Mead and Gorman joined.165 The concurrence joined the
result, but stated that the three justices wanted to explicitly overrule
the Bell II decision. Chief Justice Saufley stated that the Bell II
decision required the Judiciary to force an activity in question into
the definition of “fishing, fowling, or navigation,” and as a result,
158
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“significant and expensive” litigation has plagued the state. 166
Moreover, the Bell II decision has required the court to dodge or
rearticulate Bell II: “That decision—Bell II—has been questioned,
pretzeled, and avoided,” Justice Saufley wrote.167 The concurrence
wanted to adopt Justice Wathen’s dissent in Bell II, allowing the
common law to continue to develop, and emphasized “the public
deserves [this] correction.”168
VI. WHAT THE ROCKWEED DECISION MEANS FOR MAINE
The recent Maine Supreme Court decision in Ross v.
Acadian Seaplants Ltd. will force change across all sectors now that
private landowners hold the title to Rockweed in the intertidal zone.
Industry, local communities, the Maine Government, landowners
and the public must adjust.
A.

Acadian Seaplants: Withdrawing from Maine?

Acadian Seaplants may cease their harvest of Rockweed
within the state of Maine. Acadian Seaplants Limited (Acadian) was
founded in 1981, and is located in Vancouver, Canada. 169 Acadian
harvests seaweed along Atlantic North America, Ireland, and
Scotland.170 Acadian’s Environmental Policy explicitly highlights
that the Acadian team is committed to follow Canadian federal,
municipal and provincial law.171 Further, Acadian is dedicated to
maintaining strong international relationships.172
To avoid private trespass claims, Acadian must now obtain
a license or easement from landowners if they wish to continue the
166
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harvest of Rockweed within privately owned intertidal zones.173 A
profit a prendre encompasses the right of the public to come in and
harvest an item “from the soil.”174 A license subverts private trespass
actions by providing the licensee with permission to do something
on the land of another.175 Therefore, in order to avoid trespass
claims, Acadian must draft agreements with intertidal landowners,
to continue the harvest of Rockweed. In consideration of these
agreements, Acadian will likely have to pay for access to Rockweed.
Simple payment systems could be based on (1) the length of the
lease; (2) the amount of Rockweed harvested from the property;
and/or (3) the predicted productivity of the site. It is important to
note that the landowner can always revoke the agreement. 176 The
ability to revoke profits a prendre may serve as a check on
Rockweed harvest in some respect; landowners, who do not approve
of how Acadian operates, or treats the intertidal zone, can revoke the
profit a prendre. However, with the landowner holding the rights,
the landowner’s interests will always dominate. Acadian can no
longer harvest Rockweed solely under Maine regulation, but must
contract separately with individual private landowners.
Profits a prendre are not Acadian’s only option. In lieu of
the privatization of the intertidal zone, Acadian can elect to cease
harvest of Rockweed from Maine. The habitat range of Rockweed
extends from Canadian intertidal zones, and from the shores of
Norway down to Portugal. Therefore, Acadian can elect to only
harvest from Labrador, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and in Europe.
B.

Maine’s Rockweed Employees: Out of a Job, or a New
Opportunity?

The Maine Seafood industry is at a crossroads. The harvest
of staple Maine seafood products such as groundfish, clams and
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shrimp have reduced drastically in past years. 177 However, seaweed
harvest has been on the incline.178 Harvest of seaweed in Maine has
increased 250% in less than seven years. 179 In 2013, Rockweed
harvesters accounted for 10 million dollars of the Maine economy. 180
Further, over half of Maine towns experience beneficial secondary
economic impact from Rockweed harvest.181
The four major Rockweed companies employ on average
110 harvesters, and another 115 dock and plant employees.182 In the
event that large Rockweed harvesters leave Maine, employees and
small local harvesters will be impacted based on how private
landowners act in light of their new right to Rockweed.
Privatization of the intertidal zone may actually benefit local
harvesting outfits. Similar to Acadian, local harvesters are forced to
cooperate with local landowners to gain access to harvest
Rockweed, via profit a prendre or license.183 Unlike Acadian, local
harvesters may have better ability to contract with local landowners
for access. First, local landowners are more likely to know local
harvesters, easing the discussion over access, and may encourage
the landowners to grant profit a prendre rights to the local
harvesters. Second, local landowners can stress the impact on the
local economy from local harvest of Rockweed, further
incentivizing landowners to contract with local harvesters.
However, large harvesting operations, like Acadian likely have
more access to capital, which can be a powerful tool in the
bargaining process. Therefore, if pure economic gain is the motive
of the landowner, large harvesting companies may be able to prevail
in sealing profit a prendre rights. In the event that large harvesting
177

MAINE SEAWEED COUNCIL. Working Waterfront,
http://www.seaweedcouncil.org/working-waterfront/ (last visited Jun. 26, 2020).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. For example, the purchasing of fuel and supplies for Rockweed harvest
can help support local Maine businesses.
182
PETE THAYER & KATHERINE SCHMIDT, ROCKWEED ECOLOGY, INDUSTRY AND
MANAGEMENT Rockweed Ecology, Industry and Management, 2 (2014).
183 Profits a prendre and Licenses Distinguished; Beckwith, 175 Me at 743;
Fiske, 25 Me. at 457. 1 MAINE PRACTICE SERIES, REAL ESTATE LAW &
PRACTICE § 8:2 (2d ed.); Beckwith v. Rossi, 175 A.2d 732, 738 (1961); Fiske v.
Small, 25 Me. 453, 457 (1845).
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operations elect to cease the harvest of Rockweed in Maine, local
Rockweed harvesters can benefit from reduced competition. Under
this trend, the local harvesters will be able to contract with
landowners to harvest rockweed.
C.

Maine Department of Marine Resources: Managing
Rockweed, Rockweed Harvest, and Public Access to
Rockweed Harvest

In 2014, the Maine Department of Marine Resources
(Department) published a Fishery Management Plan for
Rockweed.184 The plan outlined the current management measures in
place in Maine as well as policy recommendations for the future. 185
One recommendation in the Plan was to implement coast-wide
sector management.186 The rationale behind sectoring the coastline
was for monitoring purposes.187 The policy recommended that the
Department allocate each sector to a private entity for harvest over
a predetermined number of years. 188 A re-evaluation of the sectors
and their ecological status occurs at the end of the contract for
harvest.189
Privatization of the intertidal zone for Rockweed changes the
Department’s strategy. The Department has said publicly that it
retains the general power to regulate the harvest of Rockweed,
despite the Court ruling.190 The Department can open and close areas

184

Maine Dept. of Marine Resources, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
ROCKWEED (ASCOPHYLLUM NODOSUM), 1 (2014). Fishery Management Plan for
Rockweed (Ascophyllum nodosum), MAINE DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES,
January 2014 at 1.
185
Id. at 27, 33-38.
186
Id. at 33.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 6807 (2001) (“The commissioner may
adopt rules regulating the harvest of seaweed on a species specific basis,
including, but not limited to, the total number of licenses that may be
issued, the designation of a harvesting season or seasons, the quantity of the
resource that may be harvested in a season, areas that may be open or closed to
harvest and gear and techniques that may be used in harvesting. Rules adopted
under this section are routine technical rules pursuant to Title 5, chapter 375,
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of the coast for Rockweed harvest.191 However, allocating harvest
areas is no longer the Department’s sole discretion, and as of
October 2019, Maine Marine Patrol has begun to respond to
landowner complaints of possible Rockweed theft from intertidal
shorelines.192 In short, while the Department cannot now solely grant
a harvester permission to harvest, they can always prevent the
harvest. Thus, the ability to harvest Rockweed requires two
permissions: landowner and agency. Likely, the Department can still
address the goals provided in the Fishery Management Plan, but the
approach will have to change. The Department may have to require
landowner recording of profits a prendre rights, and then regulate
the opening of private intertidal zones, based on the fishery. 193
D.

Private Landowners: A New Right Added to the Bundle
of Sticks

Landowners may now choose what happens to the
Rockweed located in the intertidal zone, subject to the Department’s
approval.194 Landowners can prevent all harvesters from entering
the intertidal zone, and take trespass actions against harvesters who
enter their intertidal zone to harvest Rockweed. 195 Or, landowners
who may be unaware of their rights, can, in effect, allow the harvest
of Rockweed in their intertidal zone, by failing to take action against
the harvesters. Further, the landowner can strike a deal with select

subchapter II-A.”); see also Peter McGuire, Rockweed Industry Adrift After
Ruling Allows Landowners to Restrict Access, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct.
28, 2019, at 1 (“Spokesman Jeff Nichols said the Marine Resources
commissioner still has regulatory power over rockweed, despite the court
ruling”).
191
See id. (finding that the right to regulate wildlife applies to wildlife on private
land).
192
McGuire, supra note 196.
193
The opening of private areas for harvest will likely alter the amount of
Rockweed harvested, and therefore the viability of the fishery. As a result, State
knowledge of private licenses to harvest will be beneficial.
194
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding “the state retains broad
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
integrity of its natural resources); see e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 5
(1876) (acknowledging the state’s right to limit access to marine organisms).
195
See ME. STAT. tit. 12 § 10657 (outlining the Maine civil trespass law).
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harvesters, giving them a profit a prendre right to harvest
Rockweed.196
The public has lost another right to shoreline access in
Maine. On its face, the decision distinguishes one public right:
ability to harvest Rockweed. However, precedent set by the
decision, may extinguish rights in the future. The Massachusetts
Bay Ordinance only grants public trust rights to fish, fowl, and
navigate the intertidal zone.197 But, many additional rights have
been granted to the public because they are a natural derivative of
the enumerated public trust rights. 198 When public access is in
question, courts are now less likely to find the right within the
Massachusetts Bay Ordinance as a result of the decision. The
privatization of the intertidal zone may expand because of the
privatization of Rockweed.
VII. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR MARINE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
The privatization of one more resource of the intertidal zone
in Maine has implications for marine resource management that
extend far beyond the issue of seaweed. First, the privatization
decision takes a clearly narrow view of the state’s Public Trust
Doctrine. By deciding not to extend the doctrine to a broad
interpretation of the public’s interest in the intertidal, the Court
highlighted the Public Trust Doctrine’s limits as a tool of extending
the state’s interests in managing resources for sustainability. Of
course, in this particular case, many advocates for environmental
conservation were actually on the side of property owners, but the
implication is that private property interests are to be given more
weight than the interests of public’s trust when put in conflict. For
upcoming legal cases on climate change mitigation and adaptation,

196

Profits a prendre and Licenses Distinguished, supra note 173 (defining profit
a prendre rights in light of landowners and easement holders).
197
Bell, 510 A. 2d at 509.
198
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d 561, 566 (1974); see e.g. McGarvey, 28
A. 3d at 622 (expanding public access to the intertidal zone for scuba diving
under the public trust doctrine).

2020]

The Future of Public Trust

265

a narrower Public Trust Doctrine may make it harder for States to
prepare for the impacts of climate change in coastal zones.199
Secondly, while the Court’s decision in Ross v. Acadian
Seaplants Ltd. rests on a clear legal foundation the decision lacks a
scientific foundation. The Court’s treatment of Rockweed as a
terrestrial plant fails to consider taxonomic, phylogenetic,
biological, or ecological data. Scientifically, Rockweed is not a
plant. As increasingly complex scientific questions face courts
adjudicating environmental disputes about sustainability, the
Court’s decision demonstrates the disconnect that may occur
between a matter of law, and a matter of science. Here, the Court
made the best of the legal arguments encompassing the science, but
failed to accurately consider the best available science. By deciding
the legal question at issue through a relatively simple legal analogy
rather than through an examination of extensive scientific literature
that demonstrates that Rockweed is not in fact a plant, the Court
made clear that the Court will determine whether an organism is a
plant or an animal based on legal representation of what the
organism is, as opposed to careful consideration of scientific
evidence.
The literature on common-pool resource management
suggests that complete privatization of a common pool resource
would not ensure that the most vulnerable resources would be
protected.200 Yet, without privatization, there is no incentive for a
private owner to invest because they cannot exclude others from
benefitting from their investment. The best solution for sustainable
199

For example, the debate over public access to the shoreline has resurfaced in
Rhode Island after a citizen was arrested for harvesting seaweed from the shore
see Brian Amaral, Seaweed Collector’s arrest in Rhode Island revives age old
debate on Beach access: Massachusetts laws date to Mayflower Days,
Providence Journal, June 15, 2009,
https://www.southcoasttodau.com/news/20190615/seaweed-collectors-arrest-inrhode-island-revives-age-old-debate-on-beach-access-massachusetts-laws-dateto-mayflower-days (“He is considering challenging not just his arrest but the
way that coastal rights are enforced in Rhode Island at a time when beach
erosion, climate change and the increasingly aggressive tactics of private
landowners, like hiring private security guards, are chipping away at Rhode
Islanders’ rights to access the beach.”)
200
Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources,
50 ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8
(2008).
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regulation may be somewhere in between. 201 The Court waded
meaningfully into the discussions about effective management of
the commons in the face of over-exploitation. The Court’s decision
provides a legal interpretation that looks expansively on private
property rights and regards public access rights as being more
narrowly and explicitly defined. In general, governance approaches
that seek to privatize common pool fisheries in order to ensure
sustainability of the resource are managed by state agencies and
assign private rights to fishers for the use of the resource. As
increasing numbers of marine resource managers adopt the usage of
individual transferable fishing quotas that privatize quantitative
fishery access,202 and territorial use rights for fisheries (TURFs) that
privatize fisheries spatially, one effect of the Court’s decision was
to allocate all fishery rights to coastal landowners. In this case, the
private goods are unlikely to be used by the newfound property right
holders, whose interests are largely in preventing use of the
intertidal resources all together. While this may allay fears of overexploitation for some, most privatization schemes are also directly
and heavily managed by marine resource management agencies.
Unusually, the Court, in making this decision for an alreadyestablished commercial fishery that treated Rockweed as a common
pool resource with state management, has removed much of the
authority of the relevant management agency. Without a
management framework, it is hard to maximize the sustainable use
of a resource while preventing overuse.
What makes this an intriguing case is that coastal Maine is
one of the most extensively studied locations for community based
common pool resource management. 203 Maine’s lobster fishery is
managed through a co-management system in which social norms
and preservation of a group’s reputation are said to motivate them

201

Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring
Lines: Time for More Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States' Coastal
Waters?, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
202
Seth Macinko, Public or private: United States commercial fisheries
management and the public trust doctrine, reciprocal challenges, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J 919, 921(1993); Courtney Carothers & Catherine Chambers.
Fisheries privatization and the remaking of fishery systems, 3 ENVIRONMENT
AND SOCIETY 41 (2012).
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JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
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to comply.204 This kind of regulation is more effective when the
groups depend on the resource.205 Though the Court had no legal
mandate to seek effective resource management as a primary goal,
by effectively limiting the users of the resource (the harvesters) from
the management of the resource (through the state agency), the
Court’s decision goes against our best empirical understanding of
effective common pool resource management.206
VIII. CONCLUSION
The much-awaited Court decision settled as a matter of law
the rights to seaweed in Maine. It remains to be seen whether
institutional mechanisms will be developed for granting harvesting
companies private access rights for harvesting in the state or if the
larger harvesters decide to leave the state of Maine and focus on
Canadian and European Rockweed fisheries. Much of the trajectory
of Maine’s Rockweed management post-decision will rest on what
private parties decide to do, but also on whether the Maine
Department of Marine Resources decides to continue to develop
regulatory approaches to managing Rockweed as a fishery, despite
its newfound legal status as private property. A salient question is
whether a community-based management system will emerge.
However, regardless of the trajectory of Maine’s Rockweed
management, the wrangling over public coastal access rights, the
limits of intertidal navigation rights in Maine and Massachusetts,
and the State’s interests in managing resources for sustainability are
just beginning. In 2019, several Maine state legislators introduced a
bill that would make all intertidal lands state property—and in doing
so, align Maine with other states—thus effectively assigning the full
bundle of rights in the intertidal zone to the public and legislating a
stronger state Public Trust Doctrine.207 The bill did not pass, but
204

Id at 8-9 (“[A] management scheme developed and accepted by the user
group may enhance compliance.”).
205
Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common
Pool Resources As Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323, 1349 (2011).
206
Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox., Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered
diagnostic approach for social-ecological analysis, 37 ENVIRONMENTAL
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indicates clearly that the disputes over the area where the land meets
the sea are not likely to disappear. Fundamentally, the question of
new technologies and products emerging in coastal and oceanic
spaces, and whether the Courts see the possibility of a robust
framework of rights held in public trust, will contribute to whether
these new technologies are transformative and serve public, private
and community-interests, or if the privatization of resources
continues to expand into the water.

